

Greedy Komla 'Agbdli' Gbedemah and his rascal side-kick Kofi Abrefa Busia!(4)

By: Prof Lungu

Due to editorial mishaps and our desire for consistency across, opening portions of this paper may have already appeared in Part 3 for some readers.

What we would emphasize is that, based on current knowledge, the account that says that President Eisenhower and his deputy, Richard Nixon, were embarrassed by the Howard Johnson orange juice incident and as a result of the "private" meeting with Gbedemah committed to supporting the Akosombo Dam, is a big fallacy. It is facile. We identified at least three (3) "permanent interest" reasons why the US would support those projects. As such, the Howard Johnson account circulated for generations by many individuals (e.g, Cameron Duodu, Annor Nimako, Godfrey Mwakikagile, etc.) is an archaic coup plotter narrative and historical fiction at best without the benefit of valid records and up-to-date information, if we must be charitable.

Moving forward, by the current installment, we know that under the CPP, the office of the Auditor-General, an independent agency with responsibility to faithfully and dutifully publish financial information and audit reports related to government expenditures and incomes, was established. While Kwame Nkrumah, as the President, was ultimately responsible for all acts and omissions under his government, the activities of certain officials whom he trusted could not be always effectively policed in those days. Such was the case with Komla "Agbdli" Gbedemah. Gbedemah was a capitalist who oddly, did not see any advantage in joining the "United Busia Party." But, to the extent Gbedemah remained in the CPP as long as he did, Gbedemah got paid more than double. In addition, he had access to the center of power. He could travel the world freely as Finance Minister. He could pre-negotiate any deal affecting Ghana. He could plan, monitor, and report to the "Masters" the several diabolical schemes exposed in these papers, even to Washington, in person, if necessary.

Regretfully, Gbedemah found many eager, poorly-resourced, and ideologically-bent individuals (e.g. Dr. Busia and Salifu Imoro) to take part in what's best characterized as a scheme to create acute discord and destruction in Ghana, and within the CPP hierarchy. In so doing, Gbedemah would then be catapulted into the top-most position in government, allowing him to parley government assets, resources, and policies deeply into the orbit of the West. The tactics used to create those acute discords and destruction all over Ghana were "terroristic" in nature. If we can refer to Part 3 one more time, the red-lined image titled, "Secret" with the photo of Gbedemah on top right and "Outbreak of Violence" near bottom to the right is directly from the original paper from 1964. The operative words in the Gbedemah "discord" prose include "Kulungugu", "Upper Volta", "bombings", "assassination", and of course "terrorist group". (The 2 rectangular figures blanked out in WHITE are what we would characterize as official actions/decisions. They are redactions imposed on the original document, as FOIed).

In coordination with Busia and the NLM/United Party, Gbedemah was in fact the key person in the Kulungugu massacre.

Further, since the latter 1970s, until today, information on the Johnson-CIA sponsored coup d'état in Ghana is that it was not "officially" sanctioned by the United States to overthrow Nkrumah before the signing of the VRA Master Agreement. Still, with the sudden commissioning of the Akosombo Dam and competing sponsorship of projects by several Eastern "Block" countries, Nkrumah was suddenly viewed way too independent and a direct threat to western interests (US, UK, France, Germany). As reported by many sources, the CIA outfit in Accra, Ghana, was "given a generous budget", and its agents left with little supervision to manage the "Kwame Nkrumah problem". When President Johnson guaranteed that Nkrumah's aircraft would not be shot down in Hanoi while the latter was enroute to Vietnam, it was a wink by Johnson to CIA to provide clearance to Harley, Kotoka, Afrifa, etc. to topple Kwame Nkrumah's government.

Komla Gbedemah was not too keen about the CPP's program from Africanization of the Ghana public services!

Up to 1966, the lynch-pin of all the efforts that ultimately toppled Kwame Nkrumah was the person, Komla "Agbdli" Gbedemah and Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia). Through all these events, Gbedemah was in close contact with police commissioner Harley. In fact, per US State Department records, Harley, was in frequent contact with US agents. And the reports confirm that Harley exuded great revulsion towards the policy of independence and socialist planning. (During 1957-1966, Gbedemah successfully graduated from the UK "asset school" and entered the US "asset school").

REPEAT:

By this historic and DEFINITIVE essay, major gaps in the knowledge and political history of Ghana up to 1964, at bottom of the subversion of the CPP government of Kwame Nkrumah that eventually resulted in the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah two (2) years later, are being laid to eternal rest. At the center of the essay today are Komla Gbedemah and Kofi Abrefa Busia.

Continuing from Part 3.....

READ:

"THE TRUTH ABOUT KOMLA GBEDEMAH BY A NON-GHANAIAAN INTELLECTUAL", 1964..... A PAMPHLET FIRST PUBLISHED IN FRENCH AND TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH MAKES THESE AND MANY MORE STARTLING REVELATIONS. THE NAME OF THE WRITER, A NON-GHANAIAAN INTELLECTUAL, HAS BEEN KEPT SECRET FOR SECURITY REASONS".

"RISKY GAME:

"The tasks given to Gbedemah by the Americans were much more complicated. He had to cause economic and political chaos in the country using the support of the opposition, including the United Busia Party, and prepared an anti-government plot with the view of establishing a regime in Ghana that would pave the way for American business interests. Gbedemah realised that that was a very risky deal. He did not doubt that the coup would be a success counting on all-mighty Washington. He also took into consideration that after the victory over Nkrumah he would have to fight Busia who, naturally, would aspire to the role of Ghana's dictator. That would certainly entail a clash with the British who could cause much trouble after finding out that their graduate managed to secretly graduate from another school and completely forget his first teachers.

To whip up Gbedemah Washington gave him to understand that in case the coup was successful Gbedemah would be given support to spread his power over the neighbouring Togo and Nigeria which eventually would secure him an outstanding position in the entire Pan-African movement.

From this it followed that he, Gbedemah, could become one of the principal creatures of the Americans in Africa and as such would make other African leaders count with his recommendations.

This prospect inflamed Gbedemah's ambitions, especially because together with power it promised money too. The Americans hurried Gbedemah saying that any delay was dangerous since the moment for a coup might be lost.

In July, 1961 Gbedemah was asked to come to the U.S. Officially this trip was explained by the necessity of finishing negotiations on the American financing of the Volta project. However, the main subject of talks with Gbedemah in Washington was the thorough elaboration of all details of the coup, which was to take place during Nkrumah's trip to Eastern Europe.

To implement that plan the United Busia Party as well as people recruited by the C.I.A. agents, who worked as clerks in American firms and representations in Ghana, had to be brought into play. It was assumed that the moment the agents instigate disorders in the country and start attacks against Nkrumah, Gbedemah would address the people with an appeal for law and order and would declare the creation of a new government, with opposition leaders in the key posts.

The political programme for the new regime drawn up in Washington included a number of demagogic promises to Ghana's population, an amnesty to all prisoners, the unlimited freedom of private enterprise, etc. Gbedemah was given assurances that at least two of Ghana's neighbours, Togo and Liberia, would immediately recognise the new government. Simultaneously, a campaign would start in the West in support of Gbedemah's regime. The final touch: a report from Washington announcing the signature of the agreement for financing the Volta project.

The September strikes in Ghana, the activation of the opposition and the increasing differences between the leaders of the Convention People's Party proved the first stage of this master plan. As P. member of the Presidential Commission which executed the functions of Ghana's President

when Nkrumah was away, Gbedemah was lying low in expectation of the United Party's actions so as to make short work of the principal supporters of Nkrumah and then declare himself head of the new government.

As everyone knows this has not come to pass.

'PIE CONSPIRACY FAILS:

The main mistakes made by Gbedemah and his patrons which led to the fiasco of the planned coup d'etat were their underestimation of the influence and popularity of Dr. Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party among the Ghanaian population, and an overestimation of the possibilities and power of the opposition. Very often the nature of the cult of Nkrumah and "Nkrumaism" in Ghana are misinterpreted abroad.

Frequently this cult is pictured as the deification of the dictator forced up on the people.

In reality one has to spend but a few days in Ghana to become convinced that it is the people of that country, true to their national traditions, who put the Osagyefo on a pedestal and took an oath of allegiance and loyalty to him. Explanation must be sought not only in the personal qualities of Dr. Nkrumah as a man but mainly in the successes scored by Ghana under his leadership.

In 1961, Ghana demonstrated that she can develop independently and not only without guidance on the part of the Europeans but even in conditions of imperialist resistance. The "Ghanaisation" of the state apparatus and the army has been carried out in the country. Great changes were carried out in Ghana's economy as a result of nationalising a number of large enterprises engaged in the mining of gold and diamonds, foreign trade, the purchasing of agricultural products, etc.

The living standards of the population showed a steep rise and proved the highest in tropical Africa. Measures taken by the government to create the state sector of the economy and restrictions put on foreign capital provided opportunities for starting planned development of the country. The country's constitution introduced by the British was revised. Parliament began to play an active role. Of special interest in Ghana is the establishment of the Auditor-General's Office.

The Auditor-General enjoys complete independence and controls the entire financial activities of governmental institutions. The reports of the Auditor-General, very often critical of ministers and government departments, are published regularly.

All these measures ensured popularity for Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party the latter doubling the number of members from one to two million people in 1960-1961. By that time opposition had no serious support of the masses to speak of. It was backed in Ghana solely by Nkrumah's personal enemies who were striving for power and enrichment, as well as by heads of some tribes who sacrificed the general interests of the nation for clannish ones. The

majority of the opposition leaders enjoyed the notoriety of speculators, dishonest businessmen and intriguers.

The well-planned and thoroughly prepared campaign of strikes and riots in Ghana did not yield the desired results. The actions of the restricted group of plotters were not supported by the entire population of Ghana. Gbedemah saved his skin because he did not take the decisive step.

As a result the only thing he brought upon himself was Nkrumah's admonitions and accusation of passivity and shilly-shallying during the height of disorders.

All this undermined Gbedemah's position.

Besides, he had all grounds to believe that in the long run the Ghanaian security services would reach him too. He felt that he was losing ground and that the best move now would be to flee from Ghana.

Gbedemah's friends in Washington also arrived at the conclusion that his further stay in Accra was not only dangerous but also quite inadvisable. The failure of the coup only served to strengthen Nkrumah's regime and made conditions very difficult for the opposition and foreign agents.

It was, therefore, decided to make Gbedemah leader of the opposition in "voluntary exile" and entrust him with organising campaigns of slander so as to compromise Nkrumah, as well as with preparing another plot, aimed at assassinating Nkrumah and at changing the regime in Ghana.

The Americans recommended that Gbedemah act in close contact with Busia so as to use the United Party for the preparation of the coup, and that he try and rally all opposition forces. Special agents in U.S. higher educational establishments as well as in those of Europe started working on the Ghanaian students abroad with the view of winning them over to the side of the conspirators.

Certain African leaders who resented the popularity of Nkrumah in Africa were also to be used in the campaign of compromising Ghana's President.

On September 29, 1961 in compliance with instructions, Gbedemah gave his consent to resignation, which Nkrumah suggested he should hand in, and declared that from then on he would continue his political activities as a private person.

THE HORNET'S NEST:

On an October day in 1961, after closing hours, several people came together in one of the shops near the railway station in Lome. When they came to the door of the shop they looked around them nervously. Everything went on as in a classical detective story. There was the special knock on the door, the password and even several masks.

However, no masks could conceal from the citizens of Lome the too familiar figures of Togo's Minister of Internal Affairs, Teophil Mally., and the Commissar of Police of the city of Lome, C. Dekon.

It was more difficult to identify the man with typical Anglo-Saxon features.

But the name of Leonard Desimus meant absolutely nothing to anyone who did not know that it was an alias of George Davis, representative of one of the most powerful western intelligence services. It was this man who declared the meeting of the conspirators open.

Gbedemah briefed the participants on that clandestine meeting on the situation in Ghana.

He said among other things that in Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi and other cities, especially in the north of the country, there are persons dissatisfied with Nkrumah's socialism and prepared to take very decisive steps against it. In this way the Americans thought to remove Gbedemah's rival at the last moment.

Happy days had begun for Gbedemah. The British began to show more interest in their graduate "", hatching plans similar to the American ones with the only difference that London was preparing Busia for the role of the future dictator, while Gbedemah was to be used for the cloak and dagger and then put on trial as an assassin.

Thus, American dollars and British pounds sterling started flowing with renewed force into Gbedemah's pockets.

He opened personal accounts in several banks in Geneva, Zurich and Basel.

He bought a villa in Nice for one of his mistresses, Dossea Kisse, and occasionally visited her there.

The lust for money in Gbedemah took the upper hand over fear or qualms of conscience. Putting with one hand the pounds sterling and with the other the American dollars into his pockets to pay the services of the terrorists and buy weapons for them, he meted out spurious banknotes for various other services, leaving the hard currency in his own bank accounts.

By the summer of 1962 the conspirators managed to complete a big part of their work. It was reported from Accra that everything was ready for the assassination of Dr. Nkrumah. K. Dekon, Lome's Police Commissar early that year shipped over the border a large consignment of leaflets, weapons and explosives. Several hundred plastic bombs were bought in Paris and shipped over to Lome.

Gbedemah's cousin Adjavon had a real military depot in his house in Lome which could probably compete in size with the national arsenals of Togo.

While visiting Hamburg in June, 1962, Gbedemah received 20,000 Ghanaian pounds from an American representative and another 50,000 from London. Later on the U.S. Ambassador in

Lome gave him another 50,000 as well as a special "" manual "" on the organisation of coup d'état, as well as weapons. Out of the 120,000 pounds Gbedemah paid 5,000 to the Ghanaian exile Salifu Imoro, a participant of the plot. And that he did only because it was in the house of Imoro in Lome the address of which is B.P. 20, that the above- mentioned George Davis had lived and who was not supposed to have even the remotest suspicions that Gbedemah was pocketing the money given to him.

The attempt on Nkrumah's life was fixed for August 1st, during his trip to the village of Kulungugu on the border with the Republic of Upper Volta. It is common knowledge that the assassins fired and missed. The arrests that followed dealt a heavy blow to Gbedemah's organisation although at that time very few people knew that it was Gbedemah himself who was in the centre of the conspiracy.

Black Magic

The failure shook Gbedemah so much that he immediately left for Cotonou to see Bongu Azevodu, the witch-doctor, and almost in tears, implored the latter to sell him the magic "" juju "" which would help him kill Nkrumah and become President of Ghana....

TO BE CONTINUED....(FINAL)....PART 5.....

NOTES/SOURCES:

1. Cameron Duodu. Say it loud!How Komla Gbedemah used the music of the late James Brown to captivate Ghana during the 1969 elections.
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2. Godfrey Mwakikagile. 2015, Western Involvement in Nkrumah's Downfall,
3. Annor Nimako, The River's Power, A historical Fiction. Tema, Ghana : Ronna Publishers, 2010, (http://franklin.library.upenn.edu/record.html?id=FRANKLIN_6117161).
4. William Blum. Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, Zed Books, 2003

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FOIB - Freedom of Information Bill (FOIB/FOI/Ghana), Ask for it!

SUBJ: Greedy Komla 'Agbdli' Gbedemah and his rascal side-kick Kofi Abrefa Busia!, Part 4, re-post of "THE TRUTH ABOUT KOMLA GBEDEMAH BY A NON-GHANAIAN INTELLECTUAL", 1964, with commentary by Prof Lungu.

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<https://www.change.org/p/ghana-fair-trade-oil-share-psa-campaign-ftos-gh-psa/> .

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