


THE TRUTH ABOUT KOMLA GBEDEMAH

By A NON-GHANAIAN INTELLECTUAL



Komla Gbedemah, former Finance Minister, now at large, embezzled a total of #G10,000,000, of public funds during his term of office.

As an agent of the American Central Intelligence Agency, Gbedemah planned for the launching of a coup d'etat with Busia's defunct United Party and has been in link with reactionary elements outside Ghana.

A pamphlet first published in French and translated into English makes these and many more startling revelations. The name of the writer, a non-Ghanaian intellectual, has been kept secret for security reasons.

National revolutions are like ocean storms. They throw up towering waves with snowy crests.

These are the true revolutionaries, sincere patriots and historic leaders, such as Nasser, Ben Bella and Nkrumah. But they also bring to the surface dirt and debris which a calm sea conceals. These are the flotsam and jetsam of human society, people without ideals or

principles, whose only interest in the revolutions is to satisfy their ambition, thirst for power and greed for wealth.

More often than not, they end in complete moral debacle and betrayal of the ideals of their people which are alien to them. Unfortunately, like all flotsam and jetsam, they do not sink at once.

These people are very dangerous because they are difficult to expose. A man's head is not a pawpaw fruit. One cannot break it to see the thoughts inside it. And such people hide their thoughts behind the front of lofty words. They, more than others shout about freedom, independence, the well-being of the people and even the struggle against colonialism. In words they defend socialism while in deeds they are out to consolidate the positions of reaction, and strengthen their personal well-being. They never

act in the open. Once they are exposed, they flee abroad, where they throw off the mask: they send agents to their country, hatch plots, and commit other acts of terrorism. And all that for money and power, for power and money.

This pamphlet deals with one of such traitors to the national cause.

The False Impression

He has simple and charming manners and can win friends amongst whoever he talks to by his ability to listen very attentively without interrupting his interlocutor or forcing on the latter his own opinions. When you meet him for the first time you gain an impression that Mr. Gbedemah is a frank person with gentle manners, with almost correct features, and an upright bearing. Only an experienced and attentive eye will see that for a modicum of time his face suddenly changes and cunning and treachery, evil and contempt run through it. But that only for a fraction of a second and then again the sweet smile, politeness and even kindness emanate from this man who has become the leader of the plot against the Republic of Ghana.

Continued

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

C

Political Business

Gbedemah has never been marked for any mental ability. From early childhood he had been imbibing the odour of medicines and heard pharmaceutical talk (his father was an apothecary in Nigeria). However, Komla Agbali Gbedemah failed at the entrance examination at a medical school where he tried to go after graduating from the Achimota College. So he chose the field less complicated than science. He founded a candy factory with the assistance of his father. He was far more successful in this field. However, the rising profits whetted the appetite of the young capitalist and he felt a longing for big business.

After establishing contacts with business circles he went with their help into lumber trade and railway shipments in the Gold Coast.

Gbedemah did not lack political feeling. When the nationalist movement at the Gold Coast became stronger Gbedemah understood that this movement could be used for his own purpose. By the time Dr. Nkrumah arrived in Accra in December, 1947, Gbedemah was already an active member of the youth movement and a trusted man amongst the nationalists. It was extremely important for him to become a "trusted man" since this is a basis for any shameless career-seeker and grabber. Rather by feeling than by understanding Gbedemah realised that Nkrumah was the most probable premier of the Gold Coast, and he went out of his way to become close to him. He was very helpful in establishing the Accra Evening News paper, arranged meetings of the nationalist youth in his flat and even supported Nkrumah when the latter criticised the indecisive conduct of the leaders of the United Gold Coast Convention, and founded instead the Convention People's Party. In the new Party Gbedemah became a member of the Central Committee and later the Party's Vice-Chairman. The future seemed so bright to Gbedemah that he sold his business and invested quite a tidy sum in one of the Geneva banks. He saw himself as at least holding the post of Vice-Premier in the future government of the Gold Coast and began to look for contacts among British representatives dropping very transparent hints to the effect that quite soon they might be dealing with him as a member of the future Cabinet and a man who is a smooth operator in every respect.



"" The Prison Graduate ""

The British are good experts at planting their agents' in the governments of other countries.

DEC 1964

Placing their stakes on Gbedcmah they decided to create a false nationalistic nimbus around him. With that aim in view, they put him in prison in 1949 for ""trying to instigate a rebellion"". We do not know the contents of the conversations held by the representatives of the British authorities with Gbedcmah in prison. What is known for certain is that very soon Gbedemah was set free. On the day of his release from prison the headquarters of the Convention People's Party was raided by the police while Nkrumah and other leaders of the Party were arrested. Since that time Gbedemah calls himself a ""prison graduate"". In Nkrumah's absence, he became leader of the Convention People's Party, head of its printed organ-the Accra Evening News, and carried out preparations for municipal elections. It was very strange that in those stormy and dangerous times everything

went on so smoothly with Gbedemah. It was literally before the very eyes of the British authorities that Gbedemah carried on his work for which other people would have paid with their lives while he, Gbedemah, remained unscathed. He even managed to organise regular correspondence with Nkrumah who was then languishing in prison and who thought at the time that only he and Gbedemah were in on it.

The British counted on a very simple thing:

they wanted to remove Nkrumah in whom they saw a dangerous enemy who did not wish to come to any compromise and create the seeming of independence in the form of a self-governing colony under the supervision of a governor. In this farce the ""prison graduate"" was assigned the post of premier of the ephemeral Gold Coast Government. The intelligence service supported this plan and gave him a loyalty certificate. The British authorities did not interfere with Gbedemah's activities and were by no means abashed when the Convention People's Party won at the municipal elections in 1950. They thought that everything was under control and that nothing unexpected could ever happen.

Business Again

The people of the Gold Coast have passed their own judgement, however. The people demanded that Nkrumah be set free. Unrest spread through- out the entire country. It was in Nkrumah, and not in Gbedemah, that they saw their leader and the triumph at the elections gave them new strength in their struggle for the liberation of the leader of the victorious party. Having no wish to make a martyr
Continued

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

of Nkrumah, the British thought it best to set him free and even reconcile themselves to his appointment to the Cabinet as the chief spokesman for government affairs. Gbedemah had no other choice, but to be satisfied with a seat in the Legislative Assembly and the post of Minister of Health and Labour.

In 1952 when Nkrumah succeeded in securing British consent to introduce the post of Prime Minister instead of the vague title of the chief spokesman for government affairs, Gbedemah became Minister of Trade and Industry and following the 1954 elections, received the portfolio of Minister of Finance.

It should be mentioned here that since the time of Nkrumah's release from prison, Gbedemah's promotion was hampered. He did not succeed in becoming either the first man among the nationalists of the Gold Coast or even Nkrumah's closest associate. In the following years Gbedemah always occupied ministerial posts, but he never played the role of the second man in the Republic, except during a very short period in the summer of 1961, when Nkrumah and his closest followers made their trip abroad. The British still persisted in supporting Gbedemah's ambitious plans and mercenary schemes. But eventually they no longer pinned their main hopes on him in their struggle against Nkrumah. London was more impressed by the leader of the opposition Dr. Busia who seemed to the British more significant a figure than "the prison graduate".

Gbedemah was afraid that he would lose political weight and would be reduced to an ordinary, though well-versed, informant.

Incidentally, as a Minister of Trade and Finance he was in a position to do much more. And indeed he did everything the British authorities asked him to. He did his best, of course, under all kinds of pretexts to prevent the Africanization of the state apparatus and arranged deals profitable for foreign businessmen but ruinous to the Gold Coast. He did not forget his own business and deposited large sums of money in his accounts whenever transactions were profitable. Just one "operation" of buying 24 locomotives from the Swiss businessman Johann Bernard Litscher brought him 10,000 Ghanaian pounds transferred to his account by the Henschel Firm in one of the Swiss banks. And yet the future worried Gbedemah. He did not share Nkrumah's socialist ideas although he had some vague notion about sociology and particularly socialism. But being a businessman by nature he believed in capitalism, in a society based on private initiative. While clearing his way for attaining the ministerial post in Accra he thought that his qualities of an adroit businessman and his connections in the British business circles would prove useful to him in the future capitalist Ghana.

He saw very quickly, however, that Nkrumah tried to create welfare for all and not just for a handful of the government elite. He understood then that their roads diverge. By 1957, when Ghana declared its independence, he lost all hope of finding any political contacts with Nkrumah and noticing a lack of interest on the part of the British in himself began to think of additional sources of increasing his personal wealth.

In 1957 Gbedemah established his own private business in Ghana—a poultry farm at which he employed over 50 Ghanaian labourers. The farm brought annually 5 million eggs and 300 tons of

fresh-frozen chicken meat. The Finance Minister obtained over 40,000 Ghanaian pounds a year by selling eggs alone. Gbedemah became partner in the Mallam Issa Transport Company and a number of smaller enterprises. Using his ministerial post, he became the initiator and participant of puzzling financial machinations, both in Ghana and abroad. Notwithstanding considerable profits Gbedemah received through his business, his thirst for money was not fully satisfied.

The New Patron

In 1958 Gbedemah went to the U.S. where he negotiated with the American Government on some aspects of technical assistance to Ghana and a loan for the Volta River Project. It should be pointed out that by that time the Americans took very great interest in the young Republic and Gbedemah's arrival, whose leanings towards the West were well known, proved quite an asset for Washington.

Negotiations ended successfully, not for Ghana naturally, but for the U.S. and Gbedemah. The latter understood that apart from the British, there were other generous supporters with their hand-outs. Besides, certain conditions of carrying through the Volta project spelled very great opportunities for Gbedemah's personal enrichment. American businessmen, in turn, were very pleased with Gbedemah. Ghana's Finance Minister demonstrated a rare understanding of their interests, and agreed to defend in the Cabinet a number of terms favourable for American business circles,

Continued

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

4

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

such as the joint construction project of an aluminum plant in the vicinity of the Volta river with subsequent transfer of the controlling interest to the Americans, granting the "" Star Kissed "" Co. a monopoly on catching the tuna-fish in Ghana's territorial waters, the use of the local, in other words, cheap labour, etc. In general, the Ghanaian Minister proved quite a tractable man who agreed to meet in Accra with Allan Dulles's agent as a confirmation of his loyalty to the U.S. Great was the astonishment of Gbedemah when several days after his return from the U.S. his personal assistant, Victor de Grand Brempong, entered his study and gave him the first instructions on behalf of his overseas boss. Under these instructions Gbedemah was to compromise Nkrumah and ensure conditions for his overthrow.

Servant of Two Masters

The crisp dollar notes released a new wave of energy in Gbedemah. He remembered very well the words of farewell in Washington: "" We know how to show our appreciation of the people who are sympathetic towards U.S. interests "". And Gbedemah spared no effort so as to prove to his new patron that it was he, Gbedemah, and no one else in Ghana, who could understand these interests.

Through Brempong and other people with whom he established connections, Gbedemah started hectic activities aimed at overthrowing Nkrumah and seizing power. These activities were carried out along several lines. Gbedemah's agents tried to create an atmosphere in the Covention People's Party completely intolerable for Dr. Nkrumah, by spreading slanderous rumours and artificially created an atmosphere of squabbles, mutual suspicion and slander. Simultaneously Gbedemah's

henchmen started subversive activities among the population, trade unions and the army. Brempong established contacts with the opposition centre in Ashanti, in particular with Bishop Andrew van den Bronk. Gbedemah himself preferred to remain in the shade as is becoming a real conspirator. He planned to use for launching a coup d' etat Busia's United Party, hoping to emerge on the scene at the decisive moment in the chief role. All instructions and recommendations of his patrons Gbedemah received through Brempong and only at the height of the preparations for the coup did Gbedemah meet personally several times with U.S. representatives, in particular with the labour

DEC 1964

attache of the U.S. Embassy in Accra, Mr. Dint. True, he had to see other people from time to time who reminded him that he was still "" the prison graduate "". But here the instructions were of a different sort. Apparently by that time London no longer considered Gbedemah as the main trump card in Ghana and their assignments had smacked of plain espionage. Apart from providing information, Gbedemah had to organise the smuggling of gold, diamonds, and foreign currency as well as arrange profitable deals for six British gold mining companies.

Risky Game

The tasks given to Gbedemah by the Americans were much more complicated. He had to cause economic and political chaos in the country using the support of the opposition, including the United Busia Party, and prepared an anti-government plot with the view of establishing a regime in Ghana that would pave the way for American business interests. Gbedemah realised that that was a very risky deal. He did not doubt that the coup would be a success counting on all-mighty Washington. He also took into consideration that after the victory over Nkrumah he would have to fight Busia who, naturally, would aspire to the role of Ghana's dictator. That would certainly entail a clash with the British who could cause much trouble after finding out that their graduate managed to secretly graduate from another school and completely forget his first teachers.

To whip up Gbedemah Washington gave him to understand that in case the coup was successful Gbedemah would be given support to spread his power over the neighbouring Togo and Nigeria which eventually would secure him an outstanding position in the entire Pan-African movement. From this it followed that he, Gbedemah, could become one of the principal creatures of the Americans in Africa and as such would make other African leaders count with his recommendations. This prospect inflamed Gbedemah's ambitions, especially because together with power it promised money too. The Americans hurried Gbedemah saying that any delay was dangerous since the moment for a coup might be lost.

In July, 1961 Gbedemah was asked to come to the U.S. Officially this trip was explained by the necessity of finishing negotiations on the American financing of the Volta project. However, the main subject of talks with Gbedemah in Washington

Continued

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

was the thorough elaboration of all details of the coup, which was to take place during Nkrumah's trip to Eastern Europe.

To implement that plan the United Busia Party as well as people recruited by the C.I.A. agents, who worked as clerks in American firms and representations in Ghana, had to be brought into play. It was assumed that the moment the agents instigate disorders in the country and start attacks against Nkrumah, Gbedemah would address the people with an appeal for law and order and would declare the creation of a new government, with opposition leaders in the key posts. The political programme for the new regime drawn up in Washington included a number of demagogic promises to Ghana's population, an amnesty to all prisoners, the unlimited freedom of private enterprise, etc. Gbedemah was given assurances that at least two of Ghana's neighbours, Togo and Liberia, would immediately recognise the new government. Simultaneously, a campaign would start in the West in support of Gbedemah's regime. The final touch: a report from Washington announcing the signature of the agreement for financing the Voila project.

The September strikes in Ghana, the activation of the opposition and the increasing differences between the leaders of the Convention People's Party proved the first stage of this master plan. As P. member of the Presidential Commission which executed the functions of Ghana's President when Nkrumah was away, Gbedemah was lying low in expectation of the United Party's actions so as to make short work of the principal supporters of Nkrumah and then declare himself head of the new government. As everyone knows this has not come to pass.

'Pie Conspiracy Fails

The main mistakes made by Gbedemah and his patrons which led to the fiasco of the planned coup d'etat were their underestimation of the influence and popularity of Dr. Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party among the Ghanaian population, and an overestimation of the possibilities and power of the opposition. Very often the nature of the cult of Nkrumah and "" Nkrumaism "" in Ghana are misinterpreted abroad. Frequently this cult is pictured as the deification of the dictator forced up on the people. In reality one has to spend but a few days in Ghana to become convinced that it is the people of that country, true to their

DEC 1964

national traditions, who put the Osagyefo on a pedestal and took an oath of allegiance and loyalty to him. Explanation must be sought not only in the personal qualities of Dr. Nkrumah as a man but mainly in the successes scored by Ghana under his leadership.

In 1961, Ghana demonstrated that she can develop independently and not only without guidance on the part of the Europeans but even in conditions of imperialist resistance. The "" Glianaisation "" of the state apparatus and the army has been carried out in the country. Great changes were carried out in Ghana's economy as a result of nationalising a number of large enterprises engaged in the mining of gold and diamonds, foreign trade, the purchasing of agricultural products, etc. The living standards of the population showed a steep rise and proved the highest in tropical Africa. Measures taken by the government to create the state sector of the economy and restrictions put on foreign capital provided opportunities for starting planned development of

the country. The country's constitution introduced by the British was revised. Parliament began to play an active role. Of special interest in Ghana is the establishment of the Auditor-General's Office. The Auditor-General enjoys complete independence and controls the entire financial activities of governmental institutions. The reports of the Auditor-General, very often critical of ministers and government departments, are published regularly.

All these measures ensured popularity for Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party the latter doubling the number of members from one to two million people in 1960-1961. By that time opposition had no serious support of the masses to speak of. It was backed in Ghana solely by Nkrumah's personal enemies who were striving for power and enrichment, as well as by heads of some tribes who sacrificed the general interests of the nation for clannish ones. The majority of the opposition leaders enjoyed the notoriety of speculators, dishonest businessmen and intriguers. The well-planned and thoroughly prepared campaign of strikes and riots in Ghana did not yield the desired results. The actions of the restricted group of plotters were not supported by the entire population of Ghana. Gbedemah saved his skin because he did not take the decisive step. As a result the only thing he brought upon himself was Nkrumah's admonitions and accusation of

Continued

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

6

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

passivity and shilly-shallying during the height of disorders.

All this undermined Gbedemah's position.

Besides, he had all grounds to believe that in the long run the Ghanaian security services would reach him too. He felt that he was losing ground and that the best move now would be to flee from Ghana.

Gbedemah's friends in Washington also arrived at the conclusion that his further stay in Accra was not only dangerous but also quite inadvisable. The failure of the coup only served to strengthen Nkrumah's regime and made conditions very difficult for the opposition and foreign agents. It was, therefore, decided to make Gbedemah leader of the opposition in "voluntary exile" and entrust him with organising campaigns of slander so as to compromise Nkrumah, as well as with preparing another plot, aimed at assassinating Nkrumah and at changing the regime in Ghana. The Americans recommended that Gbedemah act in close contact with Busia so as to use the United Party for the preparation of the coup, and that he try and rally all opposition forces. Special agents in U.S. higher educational establishments as well as in those of Europe started working on the Ghanaian students abroad with the view of winning them over to the side of the conspirators. Certain African leaders who resented the popularity of Nkrumah in Africa were also to be used in the campaign of compromising Ghana's President.

On September 29, 1961 in compliance with instructions, Gbedemah gave his consent to resignation, which Nkrumah suggested he should hand in, and declared that from then on he would continue his political activities as a private person.

The Hornet's Nest

On an October day in 1961, after closing hours, several people came together in one of the shops near the railway station in Lome. When they came to the door of the shop they looked around them nervously. Everything went on as in a classical detective story. There was the special knock on the door, the password and even several masks.

However, no masks could conceal from the citizens of Lome the too familiar figures of Togo's Minister of Internal Affairs, Teophil Mally,, and the Commissar of Police of the city of Lome, C. Dekon. It was more difficult to identify the man with

DEC]964

typical Anglo-Saxon features. But the name of Leonard Desimus meant absolutely nothing to anyone who did not know that it was an alias of George Davis, representative of one of the most powerful western intelligence services. It was this man who declared the meeting of the conspirators open.

Gbedemah briefed the participants on that clandestine meeting on the situation in Ghana. He said among other things that in Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi and other cities, especially in the north of the country, there are persons dissatisfied with Nkrumah's socialism and prepared to take very decisive steps against it. In this way the Americans thought to remove Gbedemah's rival at the last moment.

Happy days had begun for Gbedemah. The British began to show more interest in their graduate "", hatching plans similar to the

Continued

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

0

American ones with the only difference that London was preparing Busia for the role of the future dictator, while Gbedemah was to be used for the cloak and dagger and then put on trial as an assassin.

Thus, American dollars and British pounds sterling started flowing with renewed force into Gbedemah's pockets. He opened personal accounts in several banks in Geneva, Zurich and Basel. He bought a villa in Nice for one of his mistresses, Dossea Kisse, and occasionally visited her there. The lust for money in Gbedemah took the upper hand over fear or qualms of conscience. Putting with one hand the pounds sterling and with the other the American dollars into his pockets to pay the services of the terrorists and buy weapons for them, he meted out spurious banknotes for various other services, leaving the hard currency in his own bank accounts.

By the summer of 1962 the conspirators managed to complete a big part of their work. It was reported from Accra that everything was ready for the assassination of Dr. Nkrumah. K. Dekon, Lome's Police Commissar early that year shipped over the border a large consignment of leaflets, weapons and explosives. Several hundred plastic bombs were bought in Paris and shipped over to Lome. Gbedemah's cousin Adjavon had a real military depot in his house in Lome which could probably compete in size with the national arsenals of Togo.

While visiting Hamburg in June, 1962, Gbedemah received 20,000 Ghanaian pounds from an Ameri-

can representative and another 50,000 from London. Later on the U.S. Ambassador in Lome gave him another 50,000 as well as a special "" manual "" on the organisation of coup d'etat, as well as weapons. Out of the 120,000 pounds Gbedemah paid 5,000 to the Ghanaian exile Salifu Imoro, a participant of the plot. And that he did only because it was in the house of Imoro in Lome the address of which is B.P. 20, that the above- mentioned George Davis had lived and who was not supposed to have even the remotest suspicions that Gbedemah was pocketing the money given to him.

The attempt on Nkrumah's life was fixed for August 1st, during his trip to the village of Kulungugu on the border with the Republic of Upper Volta. It is common knowledge that the assassins fired and missed. The arrests that followed dealt a heavy blow to Gbedemah's organisation although

DEC 1964

at that time very few people knew that it was Gbedemah himself who was in the centre of the conspiracy.

Black Magic

The failure shook Gbedemah so much that he immediately left for Cotonou to see Bongu Azevodu, the witch-doctor, and almost in tears, implored the latter to sell him the magic "" juju "" which would help him kill Nkrumah and become President of Ghana. The incantations of the witch-doctor instilled new energy in Gbedemah. From him he flew to London, then to Lagos, again to Lome and back to Lagos. He wrote letters by the score to Busia and other leaders of the United Party, bought explosive, hand-grenades and revolvers, wrote leaflets and anonymous threats to Nkrumah and his assistants. Three days, on September 9th, 20th and 22nd, shots and explosions shook Accra again. Gbedemah's henchmen crept out of their den. But the people were keeping day and night vigil on Nkrumah. Black magic proved impotent.

On September 29, Gbedemah circulated the "" open letter "" in which remembering his role of the "" voluntary political exile "" he presented his "" political credo "". Out of Gbedemah's entangled philosophizing one thing stood out clearly; the necessity of flinging the doors of Ghana wide open to foreign business. Having in mind Nkrumah's statements against U.S. interference in African affairs Gbedemah reproached Nkrumah for being impolite to imperialism. He strongly disliked Ghana's seven-year development plan in which, in his opinion, too much attention was focused on the organisation of state control.

While hypocritically offering his sympathy to Nkrumah in connection with the attempt on the latter's life, Gbedemah in fact justified this attempt as an extreme step taken because of the absence of other opportunities. Written in a state of a nervous breakdown after the unsuccessful terrorist actions, this letter produced an extremely unfavourable impression both in London and Washington. Mr. Davis conveyed to Gbedemah the opinion of his superiors to the effect that Gbedemah was no better writer than marksman.

Indeed, apart from the politely-worded invective addressed to Nkrumah and his policy, the letter has no constructive proposals.' Gbedemah even failed to learn the terminology used by his masters who no longer attempt to attack openly the

Continued

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: 81A-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

ideals of socialism, economic development and African unity so popular on the continent. The letter demonstrated clearly that Gbedemah had no programme for Ghana's further development of his own but rather was guided in his actions by the desire to compromise Nkrumah and the achievements of the Ghanaian people.

The letter was written at a time when a new attempt on Nkrumah's life was being prepared under the guidance of Gbedemah.

In early November, the customs officials at Lome Airport found a large amount of explosives and weapons in the suitcases of one Mr. Richard-son. It was Busia himself who rushed to the scene to save the luggage. He was accompanied by Togo's Minister of Interior Teophil Mally. The suitcases were carried from the airport directly to the Ghana border and handed over to the chief of a tribe in the village of Avorga Baja. On November 6, a new attempt was made on the Ghanaian President's life but the assassins missed again. Gbedemah lost all confidence in the "" juju "" and showered curses on the unfortunate witch-doctor' Bongu Azevodu. London cut down Gbedemah's monthly pay.

The Intimidation Tactics

In late November, Gbedemah's personal messenger Yaw Manu, assigned to him as was later found out by the ubiquitous Mr. D. Davis, brought a letter to Gbedemah from Busia which invited him to attend a secret meeting in Lagos. In his letter Busia warned Gbedemah that the meeting would be extremely important and even decisive.

The meeting in the capital of Nigeria was attended by numerous Ghanaian exiles. But not only by them. There were also non-Africans amongst them. The question was raised in the following manner: enough of that shooting from behind corners. Forces should be rallied to organise the Ghanaian opposition and exiles and start real operations.

The proposed plan envisaged a number of measures including the tactics of intimidation of the Ghanaian population. It was suggested that the Ghanaians be persuaded that the opposition to Nkrumah's Government acts not only from without but that it is also powerful within the country and that the dissatisfaction with Nkrumah's policies has indeed spread throughout the entire population of the country. With this end in view it was planned to set off a number of explosions

DEC 1964

at meetings and rallies thus creating an atmosphere of nervous tension and fear of the power of the opposition. The Tsevi camp in Togo became the centre of military training. Some non-commissioned officers and soldiers who served in the Congo and had been recruited by the Americans were to be used as instructors. Busia was responsible for propaganda in preparing the coup d'etat. Gbedemah headed all terroristic operations. An Agreement with President Olympio Lome's Police Commissar K. Dekon was appointed his adviser. The Ghanaian exiles were given lodging in Lome and also money. Gbedemah's cousin Adjavon started forging false passports for terrorists, couriers, messengers and other participants of the plot.

The first intimidation operation "" was carried out on January 8, 1963 when "" Mills-37 "" hand-grenades were thrown into the crowd at a stadium in Accra. This ended in killing 55 residents of Accra. Gbedemah transferred 50,000 Ghanaian pounds to his personal account in a Swiss bank. This business proved more profitable than the sale of eggs. For a dozen eggs he received 7 or 8 shillings while for each killed Ghanaian the returns were 1,000 pounds per head and no com-petition.

The next act of ""intimidation"" was to be meted out in late January, this time at one of the mass meetings of children in Accra. The terrorists even tried to bribe several of the children promising to pay them 200 pounds each. They thought that a bomb thrown by a child would have an especially terrible psychological effect. However, this provo- cation was not destined to occur. And not only because there was no child to be found in Accra who would agree to kill his chums for money.

On January 13, Togo's President Sylvanus Olympio was shot dead in Lome when entering the American Embassy. The situation had changed for the worse for the conspirators.

The Situation Aggravates

Gbedemah took the change of leadership in Togo very painfully since he lost the support of Olympio and his closest associates who fled abroad. The first reaction of Gbedemah and Busia following the events of January 13 was to accuse Nkrumah of organising the coup d'etat in Togo.

They thought that because by that time Olympio's participation in the anti-Nkrumah plot had been known - everyone would believe that , version.

Continued

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

9

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

With this aim in view Gbedemah and Busia wrote hundreds of leaflets and anonymous letters containing false arguments which allegedly exposed Nkrumah as an accomplice to the Togo coup d'etat. Both of them made numerous statements to the press to that effect. However, they were so far from the truth that even Washington and London told them to forget about this foolish scheme although both those capitals secretly bemoaned the assassinated President. The new Togo authorities did not support Gbedemah's and Busia's initiative, and the conspirators were asked to behave in a more quiet manner.

At a meeting in Lome in early March, 1963 it was decided that due to the emerging difficulties the headquarters of the plotters should be trans- ferred to Lagos and that a terrorist camp be set up in the region of Jebba.

Relations with Nicholas Grunitsky and the French had so deteriorated that Gbedemah was forced not only to leave his headquarters in Lome but also the scat of his amorous exploits in Nice.

At the end of July, the 35-year old beauty Dossea Kiskey left Cote d'Azur without informing her French admirers of her new whereabouts. But even if she had left her address in Lagos where she was invited by Gbedemah, she could not have been found there. As a matter of fact on her way from France to Nigeria she was intercepted by two men who spoke with a very strong American accent and, allegedly on Gbedemah's request put her on a different plane. That was how Kiskey

quite unexpectedly for herself landed in Liberia.

It later transpired that Gbedemah knew nothing about this.

The kidnapping was explained by the following circumstances. The CIA agents evidently got wind of Gbedemah's ties with the British. Whatever it was, the CIA chief, McCone, was afraid that its control over the activities of the conspirators would considerably slacken in Lagos. So McCone's agents playing on the tender affection of Gbedemah for Kissey moved her to Liberia so that the lovers' meetings would alternate with conversations on more prosaic topics. Apparently it was believed that Gbedemah would eventually go to Monrovia, especially because in the neighbouring Abidjan a working committee set up by the Americans started its activities the main purpose of which was to prepare terroristic acts. It was another centre of subversive actions against Ghana. It was more convenient to operate off the territory of the Ivory

DEC 1964

Coast, which has a common border with Ghana, than from Lagos.

Looking for an Assassin

The second half of 1963 proved an especially difficult time for Gbedemah. He was posed an extremely complicated task: to find an assassin from among Nkrumah's personal guard or plant one there. The problem was all the more difficult because the recent failures of the conspirators put a great number of his agents out of circulation.

There were very few of them left in Ghana and those who were active were not in the immediate Nkrumah retinue. To look for terrorists abroad and recruit them from among the exiles or aliens was becoming more and more difficult, also because many of them knew Gbedemah's habit of paying in false currency or forgetting to pay at all.

During those days Gbedemah could be seen intermittently at the aerodromes in Lagos, London

Continued

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

CPYRGHT 1 0

Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210022-8

and Monrovia. The BOAC listed Gbedemah as their permanent client and suggested that he make a statement for the press about the company's smooth operations. But least of all did Gbedemah think of advertising: he was frantically looking for an assassin.

In September, 1963, Gbedemah ordered three false Ghanaian passports from his cousin Adjavon. In November he gave the names of the bribed terrorists to Teophil Mally who after Olympio's assassination moved to Lagos and after losing the post of the Minister of Interior devoted all his time to the subversive activities against Ghana under the immediate leadership of Gbedemah. Another assassination attempt on President Nkrumah was tried on January 2, 1964. The assassin missed his target and was seized. Busia and Gbedemah fled from Lagos. The first went to Oxford, while the second, seized with panic, jetted between London and Washington looking for all he was worth like the shuttle in a sewing machine.

The investigation carried out in Ghana threw light on many secret machinations of Gbedemah and his associates guilty of setting up a conspiratorial organisation, preparing a coup d'etat in Ghana and acts of terrorism which resulted in the death of more than a hundred innocent people. Gbedemah found it increasingly difficult to pose as a high-principled opponent of Kwame Nkrumah. Now he comes out against Nkrumah using the methods of terrorists and gangsters and not those of political fighters. He is no longer a political figure but an agent of foreign intelligence services who helps imperialists in their striving to put an end to Ghana's independence.

The Infamy of Treachery

Such is the infamous story of Gbedemah who from a candy manufacturer travelled the road to a renegade and an agent of imperialism.

A man completely devoid of honesty and loyalty, Gbedemah stopped at nothing in his greedy desire for power and money. Taking part in the nationalist movement he was out for personal profits alone. Posing as a friend of Nkrumah and winning the latter's confidence he betrayed Ghana's President without so much as a yawn. The parcels which were so lovingly sent to Gbedemah by his friends and party comrades-in-arms during his arrest in 1950 he threw out to the prison dogs : he enjoyed a special diet provided by his patrons.

The moment he 'saw a chance to increase his capital, he betrayed the British and became a paid agent of the CIA.

Abusing the confidence and tolerance of Nkrumah, Gbedemah all the time was sharpening a knife against him, getting ready to deal a pernicious blow. It was for power and money that he was prepared to sacrifice even his last ally-Busia.

Steadily approaching his goal Gbedemah leaned on the support of the Western intelligence foreign monopolies. He was exploiting the people from the Ewe tribe from which he himself came and whom" he deceived.

But never did he share anyone's ideals, for his only ideal was always gold. It was without so much as winking an eye that he completely mixed up the interests of Washington and London exactly as he mixed up state treasury with his own pockets.

Following the September events of 1961, Dr. Nkrumah, unaware of Gbedemah's crimes, offered Gbedemah to return to Ghana and by honest work: for the welfare of the Republic to atone for his sins. During the first half of 1962 special Nkrumah's messenger had been meeting Gbedemah in Lome, London and Lagos. Gbedemah never,

gave a direct answer to the proposal made by Nkrumah for his return to Accra, putting forward various terms which boil down to a simple attempt of making Nkrumah renounce his policy of Ghana's independent development. He had clearly been playing for time preparing the August attempt on the President's life in Kulungugu.



Gbedemali's biography is an instructive and characteristic example of the moral debacle of the man who has devoted his life to the struggle for money and power, not even for glory, but just for power which would enable him to loot the Republic's money with one hand and cut off the heads of dissenters with the other.

During the time of his stay in the post of Finance Minister of Ghana, Gbedemali, as it later became known, embezzled over ten million Ghanaian pounds. This sum does not include the money for bribes and speculative machinations that he has stolen.

Gbedemah is a typical representative of that small portion of African society which serves as a pillar for imperialists and neo-colonialists and on which Western intelligence services put

heavy stakes. The press in Great Britain and the U.S. always supported Gbedemah, praising his ability of a financier and a statesman, which he lacks. He was as widely advertised as are Cyrille Adoula or Leon M'Ba in whom the imperialists see their trusted Henchmen for plundering Africa. Whenever and wherever the nationalist leaders in Africa failed to get rid of these people greedy for money and power, there is always ground for the schemes of imperialism.

Gbedemali continues to plot and spill his web of intrigues, his plans have not as yet been defeated. It is indeed lamentable that this disgusting hyena has made his lair in an African country. Those who gave him exile in Nigeria play along with his conspiratorial activity against Ghana and Africa.

The crocodile, while breathing air, lives in the water. Don't give him air and he'll suffocate. This is the way to deal with Gbedemah and his ilk.

Let them live where they will, except Africa-then we will all find it much easier to breathe. .